i Grandi Viaggi S.p.A.: The Beachfront Treasure the Market Forgot

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Hoop Club, via its vehicle Helios, has taken a strategic long position in iGrandiViaggi S.p.A. (“iGV” – ISIN IT0005108219) and is engaging with fellow shareholders to support transparency, alignment, and long-term value recognition consistent with the company’s best interests.
• iGV trades at a market cap of ∼€ 80 million (∼€ 1.70/share), yet owns over € 220 million in hard, realisable assets (around € 195 million in properties, € 26 million net cash) – a massive valuation gap.
• The company is widely misunderstood as a legacy tour operator. In reality, it owns 11 prime resorts, 7 in Italy (Sardegna, Sicilia, Calabria, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino), and 4 abroad (Kenya, Zanzibar, Seychelles).
• iGV’s property portfolio is unique: a rare collection of beachfront and alpine properties in some of the most valuable (and untouchable) areas in the Mediterranean. Properties are in prime, non-replicable locations, some where development is now virtually impossible due to strict environmental and landscape regulations.
• The business generates a steady € 3 – 5 million in annual free cash flow, is debt-free and spends roughly € 1 million annually in structural maintenance capex.¹
• Despite strong fundamentals, the market completely missed the story. iGV operates in near-total silence: no earnings calls, no strategic updates, no IR presence. Research coverage is scarce and asset-blind.
• The company is controlled by a nearly 82-year-old chairman and his daughter, the CEO, with no disclosed succession plan or articulated strategic direction.
• Even a partial market recognition of iGV’s asset base would imply a re-rating of at least 2x, without requiring operational turnaround or expansion.

BACKGROUND: iGV – A BRAND FROZEN IN TIME

iGV has been around for a while. The tourism operator was founded in 1931 and is well-known amongst Italian travellers and families for their 90s-style all-inclusive family resorts.⁸ That image has barely changed.

Today, the company still runs on a legacy business model: selling pre-packaged holidays through travel agencies,⁹ supported by glossy brochures featuring sun hats and turquoise beaches. The aesthetic hasn’t evolved. Neither has the strategy.

The company’s offering remains simple and largely unchanged since the 1990s: full-board family holidays with kids’ clubs, entertainment, tennis and padel courts, and water sports. While the brand is widely recognised among Italian families, few realise that iGV is also a listed company, and has been, since 1998.

Today, the stock is largely forgotten. The company engages in minimal investor communication. No earnings calls. No investor presentations. No strategic guidance. No shareholder engagement.¹¹

Only one broker, Banca Akros, covers the stock from a mere P&L perspective, without even a brief mention of the value of the company’s vast real-estate portfolio.¹²

In our view, that is precisely the mistake: iGV is not just a mere tour operator, as the current market valuation might suggest, it actually owns some of the most coveted hospitality real estate in Italy and in tropical East Africa.¹³ None of this asset base is reflected in how the market values the stock.

THE REAL BUSINESS: € 195 MILLION IN PRIME RESORTS HIDDEN IN SUBSIDIARIES

iGV owns and manages an impressive 11 structures (9 beach resorts and 2 alpine hotels) in Italy and abroad.¹⁴ These assets are located in Italian hotspots, including Sardinia, Sicily and Madonna di Campiglio, as well as tropical destinations like the Seychelles, Kenya and Zanzibar.

We created an interactive Google Earth tour that allows visual exploration of the full portfolio of owned resorts across Italy and East Africa. Access it by clicking here.

Within the group structure, the company’s real estate assets are spread across both Italian and foreign subsidiaries, embedded in a complex corporate architecture. The use of different accounting standards across entities ¹⁵makes it difficult to understand the full scope of the group’s underlying property portfolio without a deliberate and detailed review of each subsidiary’s financials. 

Below is a simplified breakdown of the group’s structure and asset mapping, based in the financial statements of each entity:

• iGV S.p.A. is the listed parent company, in charge of management and control of the group;
• iGV Hotels S.p.A. is the operational core, directly managing six Italian resorts and the foreign-owned properties;
• Sampieri S.r.l. and the group’s foreign subsidiaries (Ltd.) each correspond to a specific resort;
• iGV Club S.r.l. handles the group’s tour operating activities.

As is typical for all-inclusive resorts, most iGV properties offer an extensive range of amenities: multiple restaurants and daily buffet service, swimming pools, tennis courts, water sports, kids’ clubs with entertainment staff, and dedicated areas for shows and theatre. Below an overview of the Italian hotels and resorts owned by the group:

For example, the vast Santagiusta village is equipped with numerous tennis courts, private access to the beach, a cinema, and animation and organised sport events.²⁰

The barriers of entry for this type of resort are structurally high. Many of iGV’s properties are located in areas where new development is subject to increasingly strict constraints.

In Sardinia, for instance, construction within 300 meters of the coastline is outright banned by law, regardless of the project’s nature or elevation. This restriction is codified in the ICZM Protocol and reinforced by recent constitutional jurisprudence on regional building moratoria.²²

This is far from an isolated case. Across Italy, regional and national regulations have grown progressively more restrictive, with the explicit goal of protecting the landscape, limiting anthropic pressure, and curbing mass tourism. Notable examples include the Venice Tourist Tax and the anti-overtourism policies adopted in Florence.

In many regions, the permitting process has become so complex and drawn-out that large-scale development is no longer economically viable. These constraints have created a true regulatory moat around existing assets, shielding their value and making them increasingly rare and difficult to replicate.²³

Several of iGV’s resorts, including those in Castiadas, Palau, Ragusa, and Calabria, sit directly on protected coastline where receiving permits for new constructions is virtually impossible. Similarly, in Alpine locations such as Madonna di Campiglio and Gressoney, environmental restrictions and seasonal capacity limits place growing regulatory pressure on hotel expansion.²⁴

In addition to the Italian assets, iGV also owns four structures in tropical East African locations:

• Blue Bay Village in Watamu, Kenya, a peaceful retreat with stunning views, according to reviewers.²⁵
• Dongwe Club in Zanzibar, praised by its array of amenities, including a luxurious beach and various excursions, along with a lively atmosphere filled with entertainment.²⁶
• Cote d’Or and Chauvre Souris Relais at the Seychelles, a bungalow-filled beach-side resort and an intimate private island for a unique and highly praised experience.²⁷

OUR CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE: REAL-ESTATE ASSETS OF APPROXIMATELY € 195 MILLION 

THE ITALIAN PORTFOLIO – ESTIMATED MARKET VALUE: € 140-160 MILLION

iGV’s resorts present various unique characteristics that need to be taken into account when estimating their fair value, including comparative analyses on resort location, beach access, sport amenities, room types and sizes, land plot leases, as well as brand name and target group.

A practical valuation proxy is the price per room observed in recent M&A deals. For example, the Spanish Azora fund bought the Bluserena Group, which owned 8 proprietary all-inclusive resorts in locations arguably less attractive than iGV’s, and managed other 5 resorts in Italy.³⁰ At the same time, Bluserena had stronger operational margins (EBITDA around 20%³¹) than iGV currently. The Spanish fund valued Bluserena a total of €320 million (Sales price of €250m + €70m in debt ³² ), valuing the group around € 75k per proprietary room.

Likewise, Blackstone’s acquired the majority stake (75%) of the company owning 6 all-inclusive resorts located in Sardinia and Sicily for € 109 million from the Aeroviaggi Group.³³ The fund bought the underlying real-estate, ascribing the resorts a value of € 76k per proprietary room (management of the resorts was left to Aeroviaggi).

These comparable transactions support a resort valuation range of €75k-76k per room, in line with iGV’s own portfolio of seaside resorts in Italy. Based on this, and the company’s disclosed room count, the estimated fair value of the Italian resort assets alone ranges between €118 and €120 million.

The valuation of iGV’s Italian hotel assets, however, deserves a more tailored approach. These hotels, located in alpine regions and structurally distinct from beach resorts, were benchmarked separately against recent transactions involving mountain hotel properties.³⁴ This pool includes both luxury hotel deals (e.g., the Grand Hotel Billia and Alpina Dolomites) and mid-market sales and listings across the Aosta Valley and Trentino regions (where iGV owns two hotels). From this set, the valuation range per room spans from €116k to €186k for properties comparable to iGV’s alpine properties. Applying these benchmarks to iGV’s hotel room base (217 rooms) suggests a market value of between €25 and €40 million.³⁵

Based on such past transactions and listings, we estimate the Italian assets to be worth between €140 and 160 million.

The implied total asset valuation across resorts and hotels is also broadly consistent with a sworn third-party appraisal performed on iGV’s Italian hotels and resorts in 2021 and referenced in the group’s financial disclosures.³⁶ The appraisal, which assessed Italian hospitality assets at around €157 million, was conducted at the subsidiary level and reflected a “recoverable value” based on real estate fair market estimates, providing a broadly consistent benchmark with the results of our room-based approach. For prudence, we benchmark our estimates with the amortised book value of € 150 million, as indicated in the subsidiaries’ balance sheets of 2023.³⁷

Due to IFRS Standards, the reappraised values of the Italian assets do not appear in the consolidated financials of IGV S.p.A. The only reference to the valuation is a brief, technical note in the financial statements, unlikely to be noticed without close reading.⁴⁰ Understanding the group’s full asset picture therefore requires navigating subsidiary-level disclosures and piecing together non-centralised information.

Note: The appraisal did not take the foreign assets into consideration.

THE INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO – ESTIMATED MARKET VALUE: €40-50 MILLION 

A promotional video showing the Chauve Souris Relais property, iGV’s island resort:

Our estimate for the international portfolio is based on listings and public transactions in the relevant areas. Considering asset category, capacity, geographic positioning, and local market conditions, we estimate the resorts in Kenya, Zanzibar and the Seychelles to be worth between € 40 and € 50 million.⁴¹

Due to the highly limited availability of reliable information on hospitality transactions in Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles, we adopted an approximative valuation methodology. This approach involved calculating trading multiples based on a small sample of resort structures that are – where possible – comparable in size, location, and typology.⁴¹

While statistically thin, the sample of transactions used offers directional clarity of potential asset value, particularly in the absence of more robust data. This limitation stems from two key factors:

• The lack of disclosure by iGV S.p.A., which does not provide granular performance data or hospitality key performance indicators (such as Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR), or occupancy rates) on its resorts in its financial statements.⁴²
• The complex legal and corporate structure of the group, which prevents a consolidated or cash flow-based valuation from being reliably conducted.⁴²

In the absence of sworn appraisals or confirmed, comparable transactions sourced from major financial and real estate databases, we believe this methodology represents the most pragmatic approach under current conditions.

Notably, during our research on past hospitality transactions in the Kenya region, we discovered that iGV is actively trying to sell its Kenya asset for €14m.⁴³ Comparing the room count, photos, and stated location suggests that the listing likely refers to the same property in Watamu, Kenya. iGV has made no public disclosure of this effort to sell.

Only taking a conservative valuation of the hotels into account (i.e. disregarding the company’s well-known brand in the Italian tourism space, operational performance and cash-generating capabilities of € 3-5 million in operating FCF), we believe the gap between current market capitalisation and asset value to be over 2.5 x.

OUR VIEW: GOVERNANCE IS DEFINED BY STRATEGIC INERTIA

iGV is at a crossroads. Despite owning one of the most enviable resort portfolios in Italy, the company shows no discernible strategic direction. Governance appears outdated and disengaged from public market expectations.

The company is being led by its nearly 82-year-old Chairman and his daughter, the CEO, an arrangement emblematic of a legacy governance model. No long-term vision has been publicly articulated. There is no stated corporate strategy, no formal growth agenda, and no visible plan for leadership succession.

Shareholder communication is similarly minimal. The company avoids standard investor relations practices: no presentations and no participation in capital markets forums. Disclosures are kept to the legal minimum, with financial commentary rarely extending beyond obligatory disclosures. Critically, key operational metrics – such as RevPAR, ADR, and occupancy – are consistently excluded despite being standard industry KPIs.

Even during what appear to be iGV’s strongest financial years in over a decade, management commentary remains remarkably subdued. In 2023 and 2024, with revenues and margins rebounding to pre-pandemic levels (as illustrated in the Financial Snapshot below), forward-looking statements continued to rely on broadly worded cautionary language about geopolitical risk and weak consumer demand: 

“In view of the continuing socio-economic and geopolitical criticalities, which affect the purchasing power of households, the Group expects to maintain a substantial financial balance.” (translated Press Release, 18.01.2023)

and

“Economic forecasts for 2024, coupled with ongoing conflicts whose outcomes are unpredictable, tend to reduce the propensity to spend, especially those of a voluptuous nature. As in similar cases in the past, however, the group’s objective is to achieve substantial financial equilibrium.” (translated Press Release, 19.01.2024)

Guidance for 2025 continues in the same restrained tone, despite iGV’s strong financial foundation: debt-free, profitable, and consistently generating €3-5 million in annual free cash flow.⁴⁴

The numbers confirm sound financial management: iGV has maintained net cash, posted steady profits, and reinvested roughly €1 million per year into existing facilities.⁴⁶ But while operational discipline is evident, the company’s capital allocation posture is decidedly conservative. A substantial portion of liquidity has been committed not to growth, but to low-yield, capital-guaranteed instruments, specifically a “Ramo I” life insurance policy, commonly used in Italy for personal wealth preservation.⁴⁷

Such a move might be appropriate for a private family office – not a publicly listed company. In a capital market context, it raises valid questions about alignment between management’s allocation decisions and shareholder expectations around growth and return on capital.

The pattern is not new. In 2015, iGV raised roughly €20 million in a capital increase, explicitly framed as funding for the expansion of its hospitality footprint, particularly in southern Italy.⁴⁸ Yet not a single euro has been invested in new resort development since. The funds remain idle, or invested in ultra-defensive instruments. It is a case study in strategic stagnation.

This hyper-conservative posture may have shielded iGV during times of economic uncertainty. But today, it appears increasingly disconnected from a tourism market that is recovering, growing, and shifting toward premium, experience-led offerings.⁴⁹

With an irreplaceable asset base and a pristine balance sheet, the company is structurally sound. What it lacks is strategic ambition, market-facing governance, and a credible plan to unlock value. These are not flaws of capability, but of choice. And they are choices that can and should be changed.

SO WHAT?

iGV represents one of the most compelling mispricings in the Italian public markets.

With a market capitalisation of just €81 million and €26 million in net cash, the enterprise value assigned to the entire operating business and its resort real estate portfolio is barely €55 million. That’s less than half the estimated value of its Italian properties alone – excluding the beachfront resorts owned abroad.

This is not speculative upside. The assets are tangible. The cash flows are recurring. The gap between market value and intrinsic value is real, measurable, and addressable.

The issue is not performance, but positioning. Governance remains insular, communication is minimal, and strategic capital allocation has been virtually absent.

We recognise the history, the stability, and the family’s role in preserving the business over time. But preservation alone is no longer enough. In a sector undergoing rapid transformation – and in public markets that reward transparency and growth – shareholders have a right to expect more.

As long-term investors, we see an opportunity not just to close this valuation gap, but to reposition iGV as what it already is beneath the surface: a well-run, asset-rich business with meaningful potential for growth and re-rating.

Our objective is clear: to work constructively – alongside aligned shareholders – for a future where iGV is valued for what it owns, how it performs, and where it’s going.

iGV is too valuable and too unique to remain overlooked.

1. Based on the line item Investimenti in immobilizzazioni materiali in iGV S.p.A.’s annual financial statements (2014-2023 average). Source: iGV Investor Relations archive (Link) [↩]
2. Based on the closing share price of €1.70 as of June 9, 2025. Source: Borsa Italiana (Link); Bloomberg ticker: IGV IM[↩]
3. “Posizione Finanziaria Netta” includes net cash and cash-like protected financial assets. Source: iGV S.p.A. Consolidated Financial Statement FY2024, p. 43 (PDF) [↩]
4. Based on iGV’s consolidated financial statements for FY2022 (PDF), FY2023 (PDF), FY2024 (PDF) [↩]
5. Based on the closing share price of €1.70 as of June 9, 2025. Source: Borsa Italiana (Link); Bloomberg ticker: IGV IM.[↩]
6. Estimate based on comparative M&A and certified sworn appraisal filed under the DL23/2020 revaluation scheme. Full breakdown in: Comparables & Appraisal Supporting Sheet(PDF) [↩]
7. €220 million (estimated fair value of tangible assets and net cash) ÷ €80 million (market capitalisation as of 09/06/2025). Source: Borsa Italiana (Link); Bloomberg ticker: IGV IM.[↩]
8. Company website, Institutional Profile (Link)[↩]
9. iGV S.p.A., FY2024 Financial Statement (PDF) [↩]
10. The images used in this document have been extracted from publicly accessible content on the following domains: https://www.igrandiviaggi.it/cataloghi/inverno-2024-2025/igvclub-inverno2024-2025.cfm, https://www.igrandiviaggi.it/cataloghi/inverno-2024-2025/best-price-2025.cfm, https://www.igrandiviaggi.it/cataloghi/igvclub-estste2025.cfm, and are used solely for informational and analytical purposes, with no commercial intent, in compliance with Article 70 of Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941 on copyright. All rights remain with their respective owners.[↩]
11. As of June 2025, iGV S.p.A. does not publish earnings call transcripts, investor presentations, or strategic outlooks. Source: iGV Investor Relations archive.[↩]
12. As of June 2025, Banca Akros is the sole broker publishing research on iGV. Coverage focuses on income statement metrics with no property or asset valuation. Source: Borsa Italiana – iGV Research Coverage[↩]
13. Properties are recorded as fixed assets within group subsidiaries. Sources: iGV Hotels S.p.A. – FY2024 Financial Statement (PDF); Sampieri S.r.l. – FY2024 Financial Statement(PDF) [↩]
14. iGV S.p.A. – FY2024 Financial Statement (PDF) [↩]
15. iGV S.p.A. applies IAS/IFRS, while subsidiaries follow local frameworks (e.g. Sampieri S.r.l. applies Principi Contabili Nazionali OIC). Sources: iGV S.p.A. – FY2024 Financial Statement (PDF); Sampieri S.r.l. – FY2024 Financial Statement (PDF) [↩]
16. Elaboration of data found in respective balance sheets. Sources: iGV S.p.A. – FY2021 Financial Statement (PDF); iGV Hotels S.p.A. – FY2021 Financial Statement (PDF); Sampieri S.r.l. – FY2021 Financial Statement (PDF) [↩]
17. Tripadvisor Links: iGV Club Baia Samuele, iGV Club Marispica, iGV Club Le Castella, iGV Club Santagiusta, iGV Club Santaclara, Relais des Alpes, La Trinitè Monboso[↩]
18. Booking.com Links: iGV Club Baia Samuele, iGV Club Marispica, iGV Club Le Castella, iGV Club Santagiusta, iGV Club Santaclara, Relais des Alpes, La Trinitè Monboso[↩]
19. A map with the locations of iGV’s resorts and hotels can be viewed here[↩][↩]
20. Online catalogue: “iGV Club Estate 2025” (Link); see pages 52 & 53.[↩]
21. Online catalogue:”iGV Club Estate 2025″ (Link); pages 52 & 53[↩]
22. Establishment of coastal setback: An explanatory report on Article 8-2 of ICZM Protocol (Link); The Sardinian Moratorium already before the constitutional court (Link)[↩]
23. Sardinia’s Coastline Protected from Developers (Link) [↩]
24. Sources: Italian Regional Landscape Plans (PPR), including DGR 36/7 Sardegna; L.R. 8/2004 and 8/2015; ICZM Protocol ratified by Italy under Law 6/2010; Piano Urbanistico Provinciale Trento (2008, updated 2022); L.P. 11/2005 and L.P. 13/2007 (Trentino); Piano Territoriale Paesaggistico Regionale Valle d’Aosta; ISPRA Report 361/2022; Natura 2000 Protected Site Regulations (ZSC/ZPS); Codice dei Beni Culturali, Art. 142; Italy’s Madonna di Campiglio Ski Area to Cap Daily Visitors in Effort to Curb Overtourism (Link) [↩]
25. Tripadvisor: iGV Club Blue Bay (Link) [↩]
26. Tripadvisor: Dongwe Club (Link)[↩]
27. Tripadvisor: Hotel Club Cote D’or (Link), Chauve Souris Relais (Link)[↩]
28. Tripadvisor Links: iGV Club Blue Bay, Dongwe Club, Hotel Club Cote D’or, Chauve Souris Relais[↩]
29. Booking.com Links: iGV Club Blue Bay, Dongwe Club, Hotel Club Cote D’or, Chauve Souris Relais[↩]
30. Pambianco News (Link)[↩]
31. EBITDA was calculated as:(Difference between Production Value and Total Production Costs + Depreciation and Amortisation) ÷ Production Value. EBITDA2021 = 18.5%; EBITDA2022 = 25.3%. Source: Bluserena S.p.A. – FY2022 Financial Statement (PDF) [↩]
32. Elaboration of financial statements by Bluserena S.p.A. – FY2020 (PDF), FY2021 (PDF), FY2022 (PDF); and Carlo Maresca S.p.A. – FY2020 (PDF), FY2021 (PDF), FY2022 (PDF) [↩]
33. Hotel Investment Partners (Blackstone) buys six Italian hotels from the Mangia family (translated title; Link) & elaborations of financial statements by Aeroviaggi S.p.A. – FY2021 (PDF), FY2022 (PDF), FY2023 (PDF)[↩]
34. Comparables include: Acquisition of Grand Hotel Billia Srl (Source: Orbis), Acquisition of Alpina Dolomites Srl (Source: Orbis), Announcement Prestigious Hotel in Trento (Italian; Link), La Salle, the first 5-star hotel in the valley for judicial sale (Italian; Link) , Hotel/accommodation for sale in Torgnon (Italian.; Link) [↩]
35. It is worth noting that, similar to the valuation approach used for the company’s foreign resorts, the transaction samples used here are not rigidly standardised, but rather provide an indicative range based on publicly available data across comparable assets. This methodology aims to reflect market realities while acknowledging the inherent variability of non-transparent asset classes.[↩]
36. Financial statements (2021) from iGV S.p.A. (PDF); iGV Hotels S.p.A (PDF); Sampieri S.r.l. (PDF)[↩]
37. Calculated adding the amortised book value of land & building assets (“Terreni e Fabbricati”) of iGV Hotel Financial Statement FY2023 (p. 23; PDF) and Sampieri Srl FY2023 (p.16; PDF) [↩]
38. For clarification: the values refer to a blended per room average across both resorts and hotels, based on the aforementioned comparable transactions. An extensive list of comparables with details of the sworn appraisal can be found here.[↩]
39. Calculated adding the amortised book value of land & building assets (“Terreni e Fabbricati”) of iGV Hotel S.p.A. – FY2023 Financial Statement (p.23) and Sampieri Srl – FY2023 Financial Statement(p.16) [↩]
40. iGV S.p.A. Financial Statement 2021 (p.91; PDF) – includes a note on the sworn appraisal and confirms that asset revaluations were conducted at the subsidiary level (iGV Hotels S.p.A. and Sampieri S.r.l.), not reflected in iGV S.p.A.’s consolidated accounts.[↩]
41. An extensive list of comparables and details of the sworn appraisal can be found here[↩][↩][↩]
42. Financial statements of iGV S.p.A.[↩][↩]
43. Source: Exquisite Hotel Consultants[↩]
44. See the last paragraph of January’s press release (Link).[↩]
45. Financial statements of iGV S.p.A.[↩]
46. Financial statements of iGV S.p.A.[↩]
47. FY2024 Financial Statement, p. 165 (PDF) [↩]
48. Prospectus Capital Increase, 2015[↩]
49. Istat; Bain & Company[↩]